Submission to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the Inquiry into the Consequences of a Swedish Accession to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Reference UD2019/00979/NIS)

From the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic

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Introduction
The International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Harvard Law School is pleased to make this submission to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding Sweden’s possible signing and ratification of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

IHRC, which has extensive experience in the development and interpretation of disarmament treaties, participated actively in the negotiations of the TPNW. It disseminated numerous publications, made statements in the plenary and at side events, and provided legal advice to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), recipient of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. Since the TPNW’s adoption in July 2017, the Clinic has engaged in significant legal research and analysis regarding the treaty’s provisions and their implications for states whose militaries cooperate or participate in alliances with nuclear-armed states.¹

The TPNW, adopted by Sweden and 121 other countries, prohibits a long list of activities involving nuclear weapons, including development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use, and threatening to use.² The treaty also requires all states parties to establish safeguards that, at a minimum, maintain their existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreements.³ The TPNW establishes additional obligations to assist individuals and remediate the environment affected by nuclear weapons use or testing.⁴

This submission urges Sweden to sign and ratify the TPNW and responds to concerns raised by the Inquiry into the Consequences of a Swedish Accession to the Treaty on the Prohibition of

³ Ibid., art. 3.
⁴ Ibid., art. 6.
Nuclear Weapons, presented by Lars-Erik Lundin on January 18, 2019 (Lundin Inquiry).\(^5\) This submission argues, in particular, that joining the TPNW would:

- Further Sweden’s longstanding commitment to nuclear and humanitarian disarmament;
- Promote compliance with and strengthen the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and
- Allow for continued relations with states that are not party to the TPNW, including nuclear-armed states and the members of NATO.

**Sweden’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament**

Signing and ratifying the TPNW would be in keeping with Sweden’s longstanding commitment to nuclear disarmament.\(^6\) Sweden has been a state party to the NPT since it entered into force in 1970.\(^7\) Sweden has also served on the Zangger Committee, which is tasked with formulating the list of the “equipment or material” restricted for export by the NPT.\(^8\) In 1998, Sweden helped found the New Agenda Coalition, and it remained a member until 2013.\(^9\) This coalition of eight countries called on nuclear-armed states “to start work immediately on . . . negotiations” for the elimination of nuclear weapons.\(^10\) The coalition proposed the so-called Thirteen Steps, “practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts” to implement nuclear disarmament commitments. The NPT’s 2000 Review Conference agreed to the steps by consensus in its final report.\(^11\)

Joining the TPNW is also in line with Sweden’s stance on prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. Sweden is a state party to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, which ban biological and chemical weapons, respectively. The TPNW closes a legal gap by ensuring that all weapons of mass destruction are prohibited.

In recent years, the Swedish public and government have demonstrated their support specifically for a treaty banning nuclear weapons. In 2016, a poll taken by the Swedish Physicians against

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Nuclear Weapons found that 8 in 10 Swedes “agree that Sweden should actively pursue a treaty banning nuclear weapons.”12 In 2017, the Swedish government participated in the negotiations of the TPNW. Upon the treaty’s adoption, Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström said, “Efforts for a nuclear weapon-free world are more important than ever, and a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons is an important step along the way. As far as Sweden is concerned, it has been natural to take an active part.”13 Three months later, a poll conducted by the Olof Palme International Center found that 86 percent of Swedish respondents favored signing the TPNW.14

**Sweden’s Support for Humanitarian Disarmament**

Sweden has additional incentive to sign and ratify the TPNW because the treaty embodies humanitarian disarmament, which Sweden has consistently embraced. Humanitarian disarmament, a people-centered approach to governing weapons, “seeks to prevent and remediate arms-inflicted human suffering and environmental harm.”15 It is exemplified by the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, both of which Sweden has joined, as well as by the TPNW, the most recent humanitarian disarmament instrument.16 Like its predecessors, the TPNW addresses the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of an indiscriminate and inhumane class of weapons.17 Furthermore, by increasing the stigma against nuclear weapons, the TPNW will pressure states to cease their reliance on these arms and to work toward a nuclear weapon-free world.

In explaining its vote in favor of adopting the TPNW, Sweden highlighted the humanitarian underpinnings of the treaty. It noted that “[o]ne significant achievement of this treaty is the reaffirmation of the fundamental importance of the humanitarian perspective with regard to nuclear weapons. It is beyond doubt that any use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic to humanity, as well as to the environment.”18 By becoming party to the TPNW, Sweden would reinforce both the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament and humanitarian disarmament more broadly.

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17 TPNW, pmbl., para 2.
The Relationship between the TPNW and the NPT
As a state party to the TPNW, Sweden could uphold and build upon its commitments under the NPT. The concerns expressed by the Swedish government and the Lundin Inquiry that the new treaty might “undermine” the old one are unfounded. Instead of watering down the NPT, the TPNW facilitates compliance with its predecessor and creates stronger obligations.

By joining the TPNW, Sweden would comply more fully with the NPT’s disarmament obligation. NPT Article VI requires states parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The TPNW is the result of such good faith negotiations and is an “effective measure” to promote nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Sweden said it participated in the negotiations in part because it did not wish to “evade an obligation” under Article VI.

The TPNW’s provisions go beyond, rather than conflict with, other parts the NPT. In its explanation of its vote to adopt the TPNW, Sweden expressed concern about Article 18, which addresses the relationship of the TPNW with other agreements. Sweden emphasized that the TPNW should not be understood to “reduce the obligations” of NPT states parties. In fact, the TPNW’s obligations bolster those in the NPT. For example, both treaties include prohibitions on the transfer and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The TPNW goes further, however, extending the prohibitions to cover other activities and applying the ban on manufacturing to all states parties, not just non-nuclear-weapon states.

The TPNW also has more rigorous safeguards than the NPT. Article 3 of the TPNW mandates that states parties “at a minimum, maintain [their] International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations.” While the NPT mandates that states parties conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA, signing the IAEA’s stronger Additional Protocol is voluntary under the NPT. The TPNW, by contrast, obliges states parties that have joined the Additional Protocol to continue to respect it. The TPNW also extends safeguard obligations to nuclear-armed states under Article 4. Thus, despite the Lundin Inquiry’s implication to the contrary, the TPNW sets a higher, not lower, standard for safeguards than the NPT.

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19 Ibid, p. 2; Lundin Inquiry: Executive Summary, pp. 38, 44.
21 Ibid, p. 2. Sweden also expressed concern that the TPNW might conflict with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to enter into force. Ibid. As is the case with the NPT, however, the TPNW does not conflict with CTBT’s provisions or its object and purpose.
22 NPT, arts. I, II; TPNW, art. 1.
25 For states that have not agreed to the Additional Protocol, the TPNW requires the same safeguards as the NPT. States parties to both treaties must conclude a comprehensive safeguard agreement with the IAEA if they do not already have one. TPNW, art. 3; NPT, art. III.
26 Lundin Inquiry: Executive Summary, p. 39.
Finally, the TPNW will not affect the NPT’s provisions on the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The TPNW’s operative paragraphs do not address the topic. Its preamble echoes the language of NPT Article IV, reaffirming the “inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”

The Scope of the TPNW’s Prohibition of Assistance
While promoting nuclear disarmament, the TPNW allows Sweden to maintain military relations with states not party, including nuclear-armed states. The Lundin Inquiry expressed uncertainty about the scope and significance of the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance. Legal precedent indicates, however, that this prohibition would interfere with neither joint military operations nor Sweden’s existing security arrangements.

A widely accepted understanding of the prohibition on assistance has developed in the disarmament context. Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW says that a party “undertakes never under any circumstances to: . . . [a]ssist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.” This prohibition follows the model of comparable provisions in a number of earlier disarmament treaties. Given that the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance copies verbatim language in the Chemical Weapons Convention and Mine Ban Treaty, interpretations of those treaties can illuminate its meaning. As explained in an Oxford University Press commentary, for a state party’s action to amount to unlawful assistance, encouragement, or inducement, a “nexus between the state party’s action and the banned activity” must exist. In addition, the state party must have knowledge that its action would contribute to a banned activity.

Under the assistance prohibition, Sweden may continue to take part in joint military operations with nuclear-armed states. As is the case under other disarmament treaties, “mere participation” in a joint military operation with a state not party does not in itself violate the prohibition on assistance. A state party may not knowingly engage in certain activities, but involvement in joint operations only contravenes the TPNW if the above-mentioned nexus exists. For example, a

27 The Lundin Inquiry raised questions about the impact of the TPNW on “access to nuclear energy.” Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 47.
29 Article I of the NPT, for example, prohibits assistance with regard to acquisition. For a list of disarmament agreements with similar provisions, see Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer, and Ralf Trapp, eds., The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 67, n. 22.
31 Stuart Maslen, Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties Volumes 1: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (2nd edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), para. 1.71. As the Lundin Inquiry notes, the prohibition on assistance in the Convention on Cluster Munitions can be distinguished from that in the TPNW because the Convention on Cluster Munitions has a separate article on relations with states not party. The provision in the Mine Ban Treaty is identical to that in the TPNW, however, and thus is legally significant.
32 The knowledge requirement is consistent with the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which explain that a “State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if . . . that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.” “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,” art. 16, in International Law Commission, “Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session,” A/56/10, 2001, p. 27 (“Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act”).
33 Maslen, Commentaries, paras. 1.65, 1.71.
state party’s military personnel could not actively help to plan a nuclear attack, but they need not leave the room during planning sessions and they could engage in planning for other aspects of an operation.34 Adopting this approach to the assistance provision, Sweden wrote in 2001 that the comparable provision of the Mine Ban Treaty “ought not to be interpreted so that any kind of participation in a joint military operation with a non-party would be considered as an encouragement to activities” under that treaty.35 Precedent shows that the Mine Ban Treaty’s assistance provision has not hindered joint military operations. For example, NATO members have engaged in numerous operations with the United States, even though the United States is the only NATO country outside the Mine Ban Treaty. As a state party to the TPNW, Sweden could similarly participate in joint military operations with nuclear-armed states, including the United States, without running afoul of the treaty.

Accepting the protection of a nuclear umbrella would contravene the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance. The treaty prohibits states parties from relying on another state’s nuclear weapons for security because it constitutes encouragement of production and possession by a nuclear-armed state.36 This element of the treaty does not affect Sweden’s security situation, however, because it is not part of a nuclear umbrella arrangement. In March 2018, government officials confirmed to civil society representatives in Sweden that there is no cooperation between the United States and Sweden in this regard, there is no US policy to extend the nuclear umbrella to Sweden, and Sweden has no connection to US nuclear weapons in Europe.37

The TPNW and Sweden’s Relationship with NATO
If it signed and ratified the TPNW, Sweden could continue its close cooperation with NATO in particular. Despite the Lundin Inquiry’s concerns about the TPNW’s implications for Sweden’s relationship with the alliance,38 Sweden’s current partnerships are compatible with the TPNW, and it would not face legal obstacles to becoming a full member of NATO down the road.39

Sweden could maintain its formal involvement in several NATO partnerships while furthering its commitment to nuclear disarmament as a TPNW state party. Sweden first established a relationship with NATO in 1994 when it joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which seeks to promote peace and security in the region. The PfP grants significant flexibility to partner states in determining their relationship with NATO.40 As a result, Sweden could remain part of the PfP without embracing NATO’s position on nuclear weapons or engaging in unlawful assistance. Other PfP states—Austria, which has ratified the TPNW, and Ireland, which has signed it—have

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34 Ibid., para. 1.60.
35 “Swedish Position on the Significance of Article 1(c) of the Ottawa Convention as regards Participation in International Peace Operations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum, September 1, 2001 (quoted in Maslen, Commentaries, para. 1.65).
37 Communication from representatives of ICAN on their meeting with Swedish Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist and his officials, March 28, 2018.
38 Lundin Inquiry: Executive Summary, pp. 45-47.
already found the partnership compatible with the TPNW.\textsuperscript{41} A similar argument can be made with regard to the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership, which promotes interoperability between NATO and its allies, including Sweden.\textsuperscript{42} Given that is designed to allow for “a more tailor-made relationship” with NATO, the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership gives Sweden discretion on nuclear matters.\textsuperscript{43} In 2016, Sweden ratified the Host Nation Agreement, allowing NATO to deploy forces and equipment in Sweden, with Sweden’s approval.\textsuperscript{44} During Parliament’s review of the draft bill, the Swedish defence minister made clear that this agreement would not open the door to the placement of nuclear weapons on Swedish soil.\textsuperscript{45}

For the reasons discussed above, the TPNW would permit Sweden to continue engaging in joint military operations and exercises with its NATO allies if it becomes a state party. Sweden has participated in numerous NATO-led military operations since 1995, and it has joined the armed forces of NATO member states in recent military exercises.\textsuperscript{46} Mere participation in such joint operations and exercises, however, does not constitute a form of assistance, regardless of NATO’s position on nuclear weapons. As long as Sweden does not change its activities in a way that would make them rise to the level of assistance, it could remain involved as a TPNW state party.

Finally, joining the TPNW would not present a legal barrier to Sweden’s future membership in NATO. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty itself makes no mention of nuclear weapons nor does it contain a requirement to participate in nuclear weapon-related activities.\textsuperscript{47} The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept lays out nuclear strategy for the alliance, but it represents a political commitment that is not legally binding.\textsuperscript{48} Precedent shows that, despite the Strategic Concept, NATO member states have diverged on their nuclear weapon-related practices. For example, Denmark, Norway, and Spain “do not allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime,” and Iceland and Lithuania do not allow “nuclear weapons to be deployed on their soil” even during conflicts.\textsuperscript{49} Such examples demonstrate that latitude exists in how NATO countries set their national nuclear weapons policies, and that a strong stance against nuclear

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
weapons can still be consistent with NATO’s legal obligations. Therefore, Sweden should not view its links to NATO and the possibility of joining the alliance in the future as a reason to stay outside the TPNW, a major nuclear disarmament instrument that it helped negotiate and voted to adopt.

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